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Chapter 1
Consumer Protection  
in an Era of Globalization
Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, and David Zaring










ucts coexisting with goods  the public assumes  to be  safe has  recently 




•  In  2006,  Panama  imported  from  China  syrup  for  cough  medicine 
that  contained  diethylene  glycol—a  chemical  compound  used  in 
antifreeze—instead  of  glycerin.  More  than  250,000  bottles  of  cold 
medicine were manufactured from the toxic syrup, which fatally poi-
soned  more  than  100  people  (Bogdanich  and  Koster  2008).  The 
same poisonous ingredient also made its way into more than 6,000 
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•  A toy product manufactured in China and marketed in the United 
States  as  “Aqua  Dots”  and  in  Australia  as  “Bindeez”  was  found  in 
2007 to contain beads manufactured with a glue that, when ingested, 
converted  to an analog of  the  so-called date  rape drug, putting at 
least several children into comas (Bradsher 2007).





in China, as well as  to massive product recalls  throughout Asia,  the 
Americas, and Europe (Oster et al. 2008). A similar scare in 2007 in-
volved imported pet food contaminated with melamine (Nestle 2008).










specifically  “rotten  egg”  odors—and  to  the  corrosion  of  copper 
pip ing and air-conditioner coils (CPSC 2009; Lee and Semuels 2009; 















country  (Powell  2008).  Moreover,  national  regulatory  apparatuses  for 
monitoring domestic producers have been in place around the world for 
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most of the last century to address the same kind of risks that arise from 
unsafe  imports  (Vogel  2007).  Even  in  developed  countries  with  long-
standing regulatory regimes, domestic products can be as dangerous as 
any  import  (Moss  and  Martin  2009).  The  same  market  pressures  and 
consumer demands for cheap goods that may lead some producers to cut 
corners on safety apply whether products are made at home or abroad: 
the  expansive  recall  of  peanut-based  products  throughout  the  United 








  Nevertheless,  the  challenge  of  protecting  consumers  from  unsafe 
imports deserves special and intensive analysis at this time of expand-
ing globalization. Not only are safety crises from imported products not 
going  to  disappear,  but  they  are  likely  to  increase  with  international 
trade.  When  the  world  recovers  from  its  recent  economic  downturn, 
the flow of goods moving across borders will continue to expand. Al-
ready  the  U.S.  economy  depends  on  more  than  $2  trillion  worth  of 










ering  costs  to  consumers.  But  global  trade  also  contributes  to  added 
vulnerabilities. The Indian pharmaceutical company cited by U.S. reg-




its  borders  (ostensibly  for  safety  reasons),  currently  relies  on  imports 
for more than 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used 
by its drug manufacturers (GAO 1998). In addition to the vulnerabil-
ities citizens  face  from goods manufactured  in parts of  the world not 
subject  to  their  common  “social  contract,”  the  combination  of  global 














titatively  and  qualitatively  distinct  problems  for  consuming  publics 
around the globe and for those governments charged with protecting 
them. Although consumers  can be harmed  just  as much by domestic 
products  as  by  imports,  the  import  safety  problem  raises  a  variety  of 
jurisdictional, legal, cultural, political, and practical issues that are not 












In editing  this  volume, we have certainly been mindful of  these divi-
sions of expertise, as well as of the varied industrial processes, economic 




















The  schematic  shown  in  Figure  1  provides  a  highly  simplified  model 
of  the various  links  in  the causal chain  that  leads  to consumer harm 
from imported products. At each step along the way there is  the pos-
sibility for tampering and contamination—from the initial creation of 
ingredients or other product  inputs  to  the manufacturing,  shipment, 




Ingredient  and  input  production  is  often  undertaken  by  entities  sep-
arate  from  those  involved  in  manufacturing  itself  (Neef  2004).  Con-
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sumer  products  can  contain  many  components,  drugs  often  include 
numerous different  ingredients, and  food products comprise  the out-
puts  of  numerous  farmers  and  ranchers.  Supply  chains,  especially  in 
countries  as  large  as  China,  can  be  vast  and  complicated.  The  sche-
matic  in  Figure  1  fails  to  represent  this  complexity.  Furthermore,  in 
reality,  the  vertical  jurisdictional  line  in  the  figure  can  be  placed  at 
more than one step in the more complex chain that leads to real con-
sumer harm. Manufacturing can even take place in the importing state, 
with  just  product  components  imported.  Large  manufacturers  and 
large  retail  operations,  such  as  “big  box”  stores,  rely  on  many  differ-














cultural,  and  even  practical.  Just  identifying  who  manufactured  an 
ingredient can sometimes be difficult when records are kept in another 
country and in another language. For example, in 2001 a pair of FDA 







  In  addition  to  the  challenges  of  monitoring  and  enforcing  safety 
abroad,  international  trade complicates consumer protection still  fur-
ther when nations exhibit different cultural postures  toward risk and 
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publics in different parts of the world—Europe versus the United States, 
















intake  or  purchase  in  advance.  Moreover,  import  safety  is  simply  not 
an achievable goal  absent  some  form of  international  cooperation or 
interaction. If nothing else,  it  is that interaction, in the form of inter-
national trade, that gives rise to imports, and hence to the problem of 





harmed by products, but such liability by  itself will be  insufficient  for 
several  reasons. Although  the  threat of ex post  imposition of  liability 
can create incentives for manufacturers to ensure safety ex ante (Moore 
and  Viscusi  2001),  the  incentives  from  tort  liability  are  usually  below 
















underestimate  the  risk of being held  liable, or  to  the extent  that  the 























ing  requirements by businesses  to  inspections by  third-party audi-
tors or government officials.








cross  the  border  and  enter  its  jurisdiction—but  then,  since  only  the 
product  itself  is  observed,  the  only  option  available  to  the  importing 
nation is to apply performance standards and assess whether the prod-





tion,  then,  would  be  for  exporting  and  importing  countries  to  share 
regulatory  responsibilities,  cooperating  in  standard-setting,  enforce-
ment,  or  both.  Importing  and  exporting  countries  could  harmonize 








at  times  novel,  challenges.  The  challenges  are  greatest  when  the  ex-
porting  and  importing  countries  do  not  share  the  same  substantive 
safety standards. If the exporting country will accept foods that contain 
higher pesticide levels, for example, to what extent should it be permis-
sible  for  the  importing  country  to  enforce more  stringent  standards? 
If such differences in standards grow out of real differences in risk tol-
erances,  and  are  not  just  a  cover  for  protectionism,  they  will  be  per-
missible under global rules, but nevertheless they might still affect the 
willingness of an exporting country  to engage  in  forms of regulatory 
cooperation with an importing country.
  In  addition  to  bilateral  regulatory  cooperation  between  exporting 
and  importing  countries,  other  institutional  arrangements  could  in-
volve the creation of transnational institutions that would possess stan-
dard-setting  authority  or  enforcement  powers  (or  both).  Or  perhaps 
such  arrangements  could  involve  attempts  to  leverage  private-sector 
institutions  to address product  safety,  either  through greater  reliance 
on  private  standard-setting  and  auditing  bodies,  through  trade  asso-




tion  arises  concerning  the  consequences  that  should  be  imposed  on 




duced  in  the  United  States.  When  it  comes  to  nonmarket  or  govern-
ment  consequences,  though,  these  can be blunt  instruments,  such  as 
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applying trade sanctions or product bans against the exporting coun-
try  rather  than  specific manufacturers—effectively punishing respon-
sible producers in the same industry from the same country along with 
the offending manufacturers of the dangerous products. More specific 
consequences  might  involve  targeted  penalties  or  liability  judgments 
against the specific actors who created and sold unsafe products (Bam-
berger and Guzman 2008).
New Directions in Domestic Regulatory Strategy
In  the wake of  the  recent  safety  scares  and  scandals,  both  importing 
and exporting countries stand at a crossroads. As the subsequent chap-
ters  in  this book demonstrate,  solving  the  import  safety problem will 
require new ideas. It will also require careful analysis by a broad range 
of  scholars  from  a  variety  of  disciplines  such  as  those  represented  in 
this  volume.  Import  safety  is  a  regulatory  problem  as  well  as  a  trade 
problem, a domestic problem as well as an international problem.
  The range of  solutions available  to policy makers  is a  testament  to 
the size and scope of the import safety problem. A country might try to 
improve its enforcement program by deploying limited resources more 
effectively.  Or  it  might  try  to  improve  outcomes  by  encouraging  con-
sumers themselves to take more care—and ensuring that they can do so 
by requiring more and better labeling on products, highlighting their 
risks,  their  origins,  and  their  ingredients.  Countries  might  improve 
safety by  turning away,  to some degree,  from border  interdiction and 
facilitated  consumer  self-help  and  turning  instead  toward  improving 

































suring  that  any  products  sold  within  the  importing  nation  meet  that 
country’s standards. Such a management-based approach holds much 
promise  for  conditions  like  those  that  apply  to  imports,  where  prod-





for  the  government  to  regulate  products  through  more  conventional 
means. Thus, imposing mandates or otherwise encouraging importers 
to  develop  their  own  private  forms  of  regulation  holds  great  appeal. 
Of course, the same vastness and complexity that make it difficult for 
governments  to  impose  and  enforce  traditional  regulatory  standards 
will  also  undoubtedly  hamper  to  some  extent  efforts  to  ensure  that 
firms’  management  systems  are  operating  well  and  that  other  forms 
of public-private partnerships are delivering substantive results rather 
than just symbolism (Coglianese and Lazer 2003).
Toward a Global Consumer Protection System
That so many import safety responses are located at the international 
level presents a paradox. Although  imports can come  from the other 
side of  the globe,  the goal  in any safety regime is  to protect  the most 
local  of  experiences—the  relationship  between  individuals  and  the 
food they eat, the drugs that keep them healthy, and the products that 
enrich their lives. Taking the very personal and making it multinational 
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is hard enough as a matter of  institutional design. But doing so with-
out fostering alienation and discouraging the security of relationships 









doctrine  its one good year  in  the 1930s  (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States  1935;  Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan  1935).  Despite  pre-
dictable fears and resistance to the delegation of regulatory authority 
to international institutions, the creation of such institutions, or other 
forms  of  international  cooperation,  either  through  formal  treaty  or 
informal  networking,  would  appear  nevertheless  inevitable.  After  all, 
in a world of food scares, drug poisonings, and producers who do not 
have to bear the cost of the injuries they inflict on the other side of the 





the  goal  of  global  free  trade  and  the  safety  demanded  by  domestic 









for  the WTO to accept  local  tastes on  safety and health protections  if 
such protections must be based on common transnational standards of 
scientific evidence and risk analysis, as the WTO also expects?
  International  solutions  also  need  to  take  into  account  the  various 
steps  in  the  causal  chain  leading  to  consumer  harm.  Where  on  that 
chain  should  international efforts  aim? Should  they aim  to  stop dan-
gerous products from being created in the first place, to identify unsafe 
products  before  they  reach  the  consumer,  or  both?  Although  inter-
diction at the borders would appear to be most compatible with a tra-
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  Other  recognizably  international  solutions  to  the  problems  of  im-
port safety turn more on the prospect of using international resources 
to enhance domestic responses to dangerous imports. For example, law 






















  The  various  international  strategies  for  addressing  consumer  pro-
tection in a globalized economy raise at least three major sets of ques-
tions.  The  first  set  focuses  on  efficacy.  How  effective  are  the  varied 
strategies and under what conditions? When should international hard 
or binding law, and even the creation of supranational institutions, be 




winners  and  losers  to  all  domestic  and  international  solutions.  Who 
benefits? And who suffers? How should the demands of the developed 
world be reconciled with the realities of the developing world? Is it mor-






































Trebil cock  analysis.  Tim  Büthe  provides  a  detailed,  analytic  account 
of  the  development  of  the  Codex  Alimentarius  Commission,  suggest-
ing that international standards emerging from a majority-vote process 
may not preserve the best features of the scientific, economic, and polit-
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ical inputs to those discussions. Kevin Outterson suggests the possibility 
that international intellectual-property standards concerning counter-
feit  drugs  are  motivated  less  by  a  concern  for  safety,  as  often  stated, 








effectively  to  incipient  problems  that  escape  preventive  intervention. 
Richard  Berk  explores  the  concept  of  data-driven  forecasting,  which 
can lead agencies to deploy enforcement resources where they will most 
likely  detect  nascent  problems.  Lorna  Zach  and  Vicki  Bier  argue  for 
















wherein  importers  enter  into  contracts  with  insurance  companies  to 
compensate consumers if their products fail to meet established health 
and safety standards, and he then explores the incentives such a system 
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